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ABSTRACT 
Blavatskyy (2006) formulated a game of chance based on the harmonic series which, he 
suggests, leads to a St Petersburg type of paradox.   In view of the importance of the St 
Petersburg game to decision theory, any game which leads to a St Petersburg type paradox is 
of interest.   Blavatskyy‟s game is re-examined in this article to conclude that it does not lead 
to a St Petersburg type paradox. 
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1.  Introduction 
Blavatskyy (2006) formulated a game based on the well-known harmonic series which he 
argues  leads  to  a  decision  theory  paradox  which  „strengthens  the  original  and  super  St 
Petersburg paradox.‟   He appropriately named his perceived St Petersburg type paradox as 
the Harmonic Sequence Paradox.   His game and suggested paradox are examined herein and 
it is concluded that it does not lead to a St Petersburg type paradox.   Blavatskyy is not the 
first to attempt to devise a game based on the harmonic series and to suggest that it leads to a 
St Petersburg type paradox.
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Decision theory involving risk is often studied against the background of games of chance.   
A number  of rules have been developed to indicate the  fair  amount that a person, the 
proverbial Paul, should be prepared to pay the casino operator (the proverbial Peter), to take 
part in a specific game.
3   The first of these rules is the expected monetary value (EMV) rule.   
Credit is usually given to Pierre de Fermat (1601-1665) and especially Blaise Pascal (1623-
1662) for the formulation of this rule (Samuelson 1977:37). This, as a rule of thumb, suggests 
that Paul should be prepared to pay an amount approximately equal to the calculated value of 
the expected value of the game.   G ames of chance  also  can be  and usually are p layed 
repetitively.   Usually a measure of consistency exists between the expected value of a game 
and the amount that Paul is, in fact, prepared to wager.  In this instance there is no paradox.   
Sometimes authors believe they have formulated  a game which leads to a  decision theory 
paradox.   This would happen for example where the calculated expected value of the game is 
very large (even  in theory infinite) but empirical evidence or common sense indicates that 
Paul is prepared to pay, comparatively speaking, only a very modest sum to participate in the 
game.    Therein lies the paradox; theory and reality appear to diverge or as Todhunter 2 
 
(1865:220),  setting-out  the  history  of  the  St  Petersburg  Paradox  succinctly  put  it,  „[t]he 
paradox then is that the mathematical theory is apparently directly opposed to the dictates of 
common sense‟.  Should this be the case, the expected value rule appears to fail.  Should any 
game be formulated which does indeed produce a paradox of this nature, this has serious 
implications for the validity of the expected value rule, indicating that it is an unreliable 
decision rule and then an alternative more reliable decision rule should be sought.   The most 
famous game of this sort is the so-called St Petersburg game leading to the St Petersburg 
paradox
4 out of which the second decision rule (or theory), the expected utility value (EUV) 
rule, evolved.  This second rule is evoked where it is demonstrated that a paradox exists.   If 
no paradox is shown to exist, in the Todhunter sense, it is not necessary to evoke the second 
rule. 
 
Detailed examinations of games which are thought to produce these paradoxes demonstrate 
that these games in fact do not do so.   Usually it is the expected value of the game which has 
been incorrectly  calculated  (as in the case of the St Petersb urg game
5)  or  the  game is 
incorrectly formulated or misconstrued as a game.  More recently authors simply do not state 
what they mean  by  a  paradox.  With  this  background  Blavatskyy‟s  harmonic  sequence 
„game‟ and „paradox‟ are re-examined. 
 
2.  Blavatskyy‟s „game‟ 
The point of departure in the analysis of any game is to understand what the formulated game 
is; what expected outcomes should appear when the game is played and what happens when 
the game is played repeatedly.   So to start, Blavatskyy‟s game must be identified which he 
formulated as follows: 
 
Consider an urn that initially contains one white and one black ball.   An 
individual draws one ball from this urn and receives one dollar (nothing) 
should the ball be white (black).   Whatever the drawn ball happens to be, it 
is subsequently put back into the urn.   Additionally, one additional black 
ball is added to the urn.   The individual then draws one ball again and the 
cycle continues ad infinitum.   At each iteration, the drawn white ball pays 
off one dollar and the number of black balls is increased by one.   What is a 
maximum price that a rational individual is willing to pay for participation 
in this lottery L? 
 
(Italics in the original) 
 
According to Blavatskyy‟s formulation, his „game‟ is one of infinite duration; or in his words 
it continues ad infinitum.   Clearly this as a game is misconstrued.   A „game‟ of infinite 
duration is neither conceptually sound nor practically possible.   Since this „game‟ has no 
end, it can never be completed and hence never repeated or played repetitively.   „Games‟ of 
„infinite‟ duration can either tend converge or diverge.   If the „game‟ produces a diverging 
outcome then the longer the „game‟ is played the greater is the outcome, albeit the outcome 
may diverge at a very slow rate.   The diverging „game‟ thus has no single outcome.   Thus 
for example, if a coin is flipped n times and each time a head appears, a dollar is paid out, the 
expected value of a game of n flips is $1/2 n.   Clearly, the greater the number of flips, the 
greater is the expected outcome.   That playing a „game‟ of „infinite‟ duration can produce an 
„infinite‟ payout is of course not surprising.   Games of finite duration, with finite outcomes, 3 
 
repeated „infinitely‟, can also produce an „infinite‟ aggregate outcome.   Virtually any game 
of chance, repeated a very large number of times will produce a divergent aggregate outcome.   
This does not mean that Paul will become a billionaire from playing any of these games since 
the casino operator will charge Paul to play the game.   To play forever, will cost Paul 
billions which would wipe-out expected payouts.   In fact, in the long run as Adam Smith 
(1776:Bk1.ChX.PtI) pointed out: 
 
[t]here is not, however, a more certain proposition in mathematics, than the 
more [lottery] tickets you adventure upon, the more likely you are to be a 
loser.      Adventure  upon  all  the  tickets  in  the  lottery,  and  you  lose  for 
certain; and the greater the number of your tickets the nearer you approach 
this certainty. 
 
Thus despite the large aggregate payout, Paul is bound to be the loser, the longer he plays.  
Not even the St Petersburg game is  formulated as a game of  infinite duration.   The St 
Petersburg game consists of flipping a coin until a head appears.   The game then ceases.   
This game can of course then be repeated, conceptually an infinite, or at least a large number 
of times, if, Paul so chooses.   The duration of any individual St Petersburg game is generally 
very.  The problem of the St Petersburg game is to determine the expected value of a game of 
a finite duration, but the point of termination is unknown. 
 
Since the eternal flipping of a coin produces a divergent outcome it should not be formulated 
as a game.   Rather it is the single flip of the coin which is defined as the game.   This game 
can then be repeated and how the expected values of a single flip of the coin (or the average 
outcome) changes when the game is  repeated a number of times can be studied (Vivian 
2003a). 
 
Blavatskyy‟s „game‟ is thus misconstrued as a game.  The eternal extractions from the urn 
clearly cannot be defined as a game.  In order to make some sense of Blavatskyy‟s game, it 
has to be confined to a finite number say n extractions from the urn.   The expected payout 
(paying $1 every time a white ball is drawn) of Blavatskyy‟s game if played for duration of n 
extractions approximates to:  
 
Sn ≈ 1/2 + 1/3 + 1/4 ... + 1/(n+1)  
 
This is of course a subset of the well-known harmonic series




3.  Does Blavatskyy‟s „game‟ produce a paradox? 
If Blavatskyy‟s game is played for n iterations does it produce a paradox?  As indicated the 
expected value of the harmonic series game played n iterations is:  
 








if n = e
k, then  
 
Sn ≈ k - 0.4228 
 
From which it is clear that it is a simple matter to determine the EMV of a game consisting of 
n iterations.  At this juncture it is appropriate to recall that the St Petersburg game is thought 
to produce a paradox because of the great divergence between the theoretical prediction and 
the empirical evidence of the amount Paul is prepared to pay.   The traditional determination 
of the EMV of the St Petersburg game is infinite but empirical evidence indicates Paul is 
prepared to pay only a very modest sum of about $13 to play the game; hence the paradox.    
No such paradox exists with regard to Blavatskyy‟s game.   Even for a game consisting of a 
very large number of extractions, Sn is still very modest and can be determined with a high 
degree  of  confidence  from  the  above  equation.      According  to  Blavatskyy  (2006:221) 
(presumably  shown  empirically)  participants  to  the  game  will  only  offer  a  very  modest 
amount to participate.   Theory and reality thus converge and no paradox in the Todhunter 
sense exists.   Oddly despite indicating that his game produces a paradox, Blavatskyy does 
not clearly indicate what he considered to be the paradox. 
 
4.  Who is Paul? 
As  indicated  historically,  a  paradox  is  said  to  exist  because  of  the  mismatch  of  Paul‟s 
assessment of the value of a game and the calculated expected value.   As is now argued, the 
mismatch depends to a large measure on who Paul is.
9   Although it is accepted in the case of 
the St Petersburg game, Paul will be prepared to offer only a modest amount to play the 
game, little is said about how he arrives at his conclusion.  The most common mechanism to 
arrive at a value is to explain the game to an audience and ask them to write a number on a 
piece of paper and then, after excluding outliers, to take the average of the numbers provided.   
A conceptual advancement on this traditional method is now  suggested.   Consider three 
different  categories into which Paul may fall.   Paul  may be a novice   (uninitiated),  a 
mathematician, or  an observer.   Depending on w hich of the three he is, he may  have a 
different answer to the question as to the value of any game.   To understand this, it is again 
necessary to take a step back in time. 
 
One common view (not necessarily the correct view) of the origins of probab ility theory is 
that it evolved to solve gambling problems, specifically those posed by Chevalier de  Méré 
(1607-1684)  to  Pierre  de Fermat  (1601-1665)  and Blaise Pascal (1623 -1662)  (Maistrov 
1974).   One such problem was to determine the probability of a six not turning up when a die 
is thrown four times in a row, (or four dice are thrown once) (Maistrov 1974:41).   If the six 
does turn-up Paul wins.     What De Méré needed was  a mathematician to calculate the 
probability so that he could know with confidence that if he offered this game, that he would 
win, in the long run.   At the time no-one knew how to calculate this probability and its value 
could not be merely  guessed   with confidence.   The probability was  calculated  by the 
mathematicians of the day  to be 625/1296 or 0.4823; just short of 50 percent.    This 
probability marginally favoured De Méré.    Since the average gambler who is offered this 
game (at the time) could not work out this probability, De Méré reasoned that this marginal 
advantage would make him  very wealthy in the long run.  From this background it can be 
accepted as a point of departure that  at least since the mid  1650s it has been known and 
accepted as a historical fact that the uninitiated (or novice) gambler is incapable of correctly 
estimating the probability or expected value of a complex game. 5 
 
 
On the other hand, since the mid 1650s, equally, it also can be accepted that mathematicians 
may  indeed  be  capable  of  correctly  working  out  expected  values  of  complex  games.   
Mathematicians can however, and often do, make mistakes. 
 
Since mathematicians can and do make mistakes a third procedure to determine an amount 
Paul should be prepared to wager is suggested and that is to observe the outcomes when the 
game  is  played  repeatedly.      Since  the  game  can  be  played  and  outcomes  recorded,  the 
observer, even if unskilled in mathematics, would be in a better position to make an informed 
decision on the amount to wager.   Thus for example if the St Petersburg game is played a 
billion times it will be observed that the expected value of all of these games is a mere $15 
per game played (Vivian 2003).   Paul having observed this will be very irrational to wager 
say a large sum, say $200 000 per game.  In the age of the computer, games can be simulated 
to determine the expected value when played a large number of times. 
 
4.1. Paul the novice or uninitiated 
With  this  the  elucidation  of  the  historical  position,  Blavatskyy‟s  paradox  is  returned  to.   
Blavatskyy gets close to understanding that his game does not produce a paradox when he 
states, „The proposed paradox may be refuted on practical grounds.   Since it employs a 
lottery with [a] logarithmically growing mean, about 10
43 iterations are required to guarantee 
at least a modest expected outcome of 100 dollars.‟   If Blavatskyy‟s game consists of 10
43 
iterations, then the above formula produces an expected value of $98.59.   A more accurate 
statement of the expected value is $98.59 ± λ where λ represents an amount chosen which is 
commensurate  with the  level  of confidence in  that  outcome  (Vivian 2003a).   So if Paul 
selects a value of say $100 to participate in the game there is no paradox; theory and practice 
are in agreement.   Blavatskyy, unfortunately, does not provide any empirical evidence as to 
the amount Paul will offer to participate in a game of 10
43 extractions but he immediately 
goes on to suggest a game with a different number of iterations, 10
15 which he suggests can 
be played using a high speed computer in a period of 5 minutes.   Using the above formula 
the expected value of a game consisting of 10
15 extractions is $34.54 ± λ.   If the desired 
confidence level is ignored (as is usually the case) the game will yield an expected value of 
$34.54.   Blavatskyy notes however, that Paul‟s willingness to pay (WTP) is less than $10.   
He does not provide any evidence in support of the $10 or indicate how this figure is arrived 
at.  A novice may well suggest an amount of $10 as the maximum about he or she is prepared 
to pay, but neither a mathematician nor anyone who has observed the outcome of a game 
consisting  of  10
15  extractions  as  obtained  by  simulating  the  game  using  a  high  speed 
computer would do so. 
 
Now what kind of Paul will offer only $10 when the calculated and observed expected value 
is of the order of $34.54?   He must be a novice.   He is not a mathematician.   If for example 
one asks a number students who have no knowledge of mathematics and explain to them, 
only once, the harmonic series game and then say to them, „The game is now going to be 
played once, 10
15 times.   Write on a piece of a paper what you believe the expected value of 
the game will be?‟   There can be little doubt that these totally uninitiated students will not 
accurately guess the correct answer.   This simply means that inexperienced persons do not 
accurately predict expected outcomes of complex games.   This as pointed out above has been 
accepted since the 1650s.   If Blavatskyy had stated his problem as, „Do uninitiated persons 
accurately predict expected values of complex games?‟  Then the above experiment based on 6 
 
his game will provide the appropriate and well-known answer; no they do not.   This however 
is neither a paradox nor new.   It is not a contradiction in decision theory to hold that persons 
cannot correctly guess expected values of complex games.   This is where decision theory 
started  in  the  mid-1650s  when  De  Méré  set  about  involving  mathematicians  in  solving 
complex gambling problems.   The fact that in Blavatskyy‟s game persons are unable to 
correctly estimate the expected value of this complex game does not demonstrate a paradox 
but confirms that which has been known for a long time; the uninitiated cannot accurately 
estimate the probabilities (or expected values) of complex games of chance.   After all, it took 
some of the world‟s most famous mathematicians to prove the harmonic series does indeed 
diverge.   
 
4.2. Paul the mathematician 
Generally, when attempting to design a decision paradox it should be accepted that Paul is a 
mathematician (or has hired one) and not a mere novice.   To accept otherwise is simply to 
continually re-prove that novices cannot correctly estimate expected outcomes of complex 
games of chance.   Paul is capable of correctly determining, mathematically, the expected 
value of the proposed game.   In this case it can be accepted that Paul as a mathematician (or 
has hired one) can calculate the expected value of the game and will arrive at the above 
formula.  In this event he will calculate the breakeven expected value of $36 from playing the 
game with 10
15 iterations.   History illustrates that mathematicians have not always been a 
good option.   They have been known to make mistakes.   When De Méré‟s game of no sixes 
ceased to produce an income he invented another even more complex game.   This time 
however he (or his hired mathematicians) made a mistake in the calculation of the expected 
value.   Unbeknown to him the marginal bias was against him.   The more he played the more 
he lost.  He put all his faith in the incorrect calculation.  In the end „he ruined himself and 
ultimately he ended up impoverished‟ (Maistrov 1974:41). 
 
4.3. Paul the observer 
If Paul exercises a bit of common sense he would go to a casino where harmonic sequence 
games are played and observe the games for some time.   Each game consisting of 10
15 
extractions, after all, using a high speed computer, takes only 5 minutes to complete.   After 
observing this game being played for a couple of hours and noting that almost invariably the 
game produces an outcome of the order $36, if he is then asked to predict the outcome there 
can be little doubt that he will select a figure of the order of $36 and not the much smaller 
figure of $10, which Blavatskyy puts forward.   It is the failure to understand the importance 
of experience or observed results which, incidentally, legend has it, explains why Chevalier 
de Méré did not become wealthy from his game of no sixes, as Maistrov records.   Players 
soon discovered that by playing the game long enough they lost money.   The game, they 
observed, was not fair to them and they stopped playing.   Observation or experience soon 
reveals, as Adam Smith noted the correctness of expected outcomes of games.   In a sense a 
casino operator is an observer.   In operating the casino and maintaining a set of accounts the 
operator  will  get  a  good  feel  for  the  expected  values  of  specific  games,  or  from  Adam 
Smith‟s observation the operator will know if he is making or losing money.    
 
It can be concluded it is only a novice who will estimate the expected value of Blavatskyy‟s 
game  consisting  of  10
15  iterations  to  be  $10,  a  figure  easily  refuted  by  calculation  or 
observation.   So the question in deciding if a paradox exists should be; do the calculated and 
empirical determined values of the expected monetary value of a defined game inexplicitly 7 
 
differ?      The  empirical  value  should  be  determined  by  simulation,  not  from  asking  the 
uninitiated to guess the value.
10  The question cannot be; do uninitiated persons guess a value 
different from the calculated value?    
 
5.  Conclusion 
Blavatskyy attempted to formulate a game based on the harmonic series to produce a decision 
theory paradox akin to the St Petersburg paradox.   An examination of his attempt however 
reveals that his „game‟ does not do so.   There is no divergence between the value determined 
by  the  application  of  the  expected  monetary  value  rule  and  what  a  rational  experienced 
person will offer to pay to play the game.  This being so, there is no need to evoke the 
expected utility value theory to explain the choice made by Paul.  Blavatskyy‟s attempt does 
however reveal a methodological problem with attempts to produce a St Petersburg type of 
paradox and that is, the failure to clearly define the problem being addressed.   To constitute a 
paradox  the  question  should  be;  does  the  objectively  determined  empirical  value  of  the 
expected outcome of a game differ significantly and inexplicably from the mathematically 
determined value.   If it does, history suggests that the mathematical determination of the 
expected value be checked. 
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1 This article has benefited from the insightful comments of two anonymous referees.   The 
usual disclaimers apply. 
2 This was recently done by Nover et al (2004) who suggested a paradox from the alternating 
harmonic series.   For a demonstration that their suggested game does not lead to a paradox of 
the St Petersburg paradox type see Vivian (2006).  In examining Nover et al (2004) games, 
Fine (2008:467) has also concluded (for different reasons), „… that there is no failure of 
standard utility theory in assessing these gambles and no paradox.‟  
3 Reference to Peter and Paul comes from Bernoulli (1954/1738) 
4 The St Petersburg game was first set-out by Nicolas Bernoulli in a letter to de Montmort 
(1678-1719) in 1713. 
5 That the St Petersburg game does not produce a paradox see Vivian (2003). 
6 More fully the harmonic series is 1+ 1/2 + 1/3 + 1/4 ... + 1/n.  
7 The rather neat proof that the harmonic series is divergent was first set-out by Nicole 
d‟Oresme (ca 1323-1382) which proof  seemed to be mislaid for several centuries and three 
further proofs were advanced by Pietro Mengoli  (1647), Johann Bernoulli (1687) and shortly 
thereafter by Jakob Bernoulli.   For a recent short history of the harmonic series see 
Derbyshire (2003). 
8 Blavatskyy (2006:222) 
9 Traditionally three different categories of decision makers can be identified, risk takers, 
persons who are risk averse and those who are risk neutral.   
10 For a simulated demonstration that the expected value of the St Petersburg game can be 
determined with a high degree of confidence see Vivian (2004). 